

1 **Q. Reference Evidence of Dr. Sean Cleary dated September 25, 2018**

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3 **Pages 21-24: Dr. Cleary uses two measures of operating income volatility (CV (EBIT)**  
4 **and CV (EBIT) / Sales) to quantify Newfoundland Power’s level of business risk. Have**  
5 **these measure ever been accepted by a regulatory board in establishing the fair ROE**  
6 **and capital structure for a utility? If yes, please provide references to the decisions.**

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8 **A.** Dr. Cleary provided the CV(EBIT) measure and two slight variations of the CV(EBIT) during the  
9 2016 NP Rate proceedings.

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11 In Order No. P.U. 18 (2016), the Board stated in its findings on page 19, lines 11-14:

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13 “The assessment of business risk is acknowledged by the experts to be primarily a  
14 qualitative judgment, although Dr. Cleary did provide a quantitative assessment of  
15 operating income volatility which, he stated, supported his qualitative assessment  
16 of a low business risk for Newfoundland Power.”

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18 While there is nothing in this statement that suggests the Board accepted this evidence,  
19 there is certainly no indication that it was rejected, since it appears to have considered it.

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21 The Board further stated in Order No. P.U. 18 (2016) on page 19, lines 26-29:

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23 “The Board agrees with the opinions of Drs. Booth and Cleary that the risks  
24 associated with Muskrat Falls and the negative economic outlook have not  
25 increased Newfoundland Power's business risk from average to above average at  
26 this time, compared to other Canadian utilities.”

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28 During the 2016 Generic Cost of Capital proceedings in Alberta, the Alberta Utilities Commission  
29 (AUC) made the following statements in Decision 20622-D01-2016:

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31 Page 99:

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33 “440. Dr. Cleary described business risk as some variation of factors that cause uncertainty, or  
34 volatility, in operating income. In his opinion, most experts would agree with this  
35 description. Dr. Cleary used a coefficient of variation (CV) of the EBIT/sales ratio to  
36 quantify the level of business risk of the affected utilities.

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38 441. Dr. Cleary concluded that the affected utilities have low business risk, as demonstrated by  
39 their low earnings volatility, their ability to generate high operating profit margins, and  
40 their ability to grow operating earnings. In his view, this low risk supported a 100 bps  
41 “across the board” reduction in deemed equity ratios. Dr. Cleary reached this conclusion  
42 by examining the historical allowed ROEs of the affected utilities, by calculating the CV  
43 of the EBIT/sales ratio and the CV of ROE of the affected utilities and comparing them to  
44 U.S. and other Canadian utilities; and by analyzing the median annual percentage EBIT  
growth of the affected utilities and comparing them to U.S. and other Canadian utilities.

1           442.     In assessing business risk, Dr. Cleary examined the ability of the affected utilities to earn  
2                   their allowed ROEs on a consistent basis from 2005-2014. The yearly figures illustrated  
3                   that the affected utilities earned average and median ROEs above the allowed ROE in all  
4                   years except 2005, when the average ROE was 0.18 per cent below the allowed ROE. In  
5                   his submission, this consistent overearning indicated that the affected utilities operate in  
6                   an environment with low overall business risk.”

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8           Page 112:

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10          “Commission findings:

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12          508.     Dr. Cleary attempted to mathematically quantify the business risk of the affected utilities  
13                   using a CV of the EBIT/sales ratio. The Commission continues to consider, as it did in  
14                   the following quote from Decision 2004-052 (2004 GCOC decision), that judgement is a  
15                   critical component of determining the fair return for utilities.

16  
17                   “The assessment of the level of business risk of the utilities is also a  
18                   subjective concept. Consequently, the Board [Alberta Energy and Utilities  
19                   Board] considers that there is no single accepted mathematical way to make  
20                   a determination of equity ratio based on a given level of business risk.”

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22          There is no indication in the passages above that Dr. Cleary’s CV(EBIT/Sales) evidence was  
23                   rejected, as the AUC did consider Dr. Cleary’s quantitative evidence.

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25          During the 2018 Generic Cost of Capital proceedings in Alberta, the Alberta Utilities Commission  
26                   (AUC) made the following statements in Decision 22570-D01-2018, which suggest they did not  
27                   accept his CV(EBIT/Sales) analysis:

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29          Page 58:

30  
31          “271.     As discussed in Section 9.3.3, because of issues identified with Dr. Cleary’s quantitative-  
32                   based comparison of the business risks of the affected utilities and U.S. utilities, the  
33                   Commission is not convinced that there is substantial evidence on which to exclude the use  
34                   of U.S. proxy groups.”

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36          Page 131:

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38          “646.     The Commission considers that there is no single accepted mathematical way to quantify  
39                   business risk, as demonstrated by the number of different quantitative analyses undertaken  
40                   by the parties in this proceeding.”

41  
42          The fact that the AUC did not accept Dr. Cleary’s CV(EBIT/Sales) analysis in 2018 does  
43                   not imply it is not a valid approach. As argued by Dr. Cleary on pages 20-22 of his  
44                   evidence, the CV(EBIT) is a commonly used measure of business risk in finance. Dr.  
45                   Cleary used CV(EBIT/Sales)) as the primary measure when evaluating Alberta utilities to  
46                   account for the high growth in EBIT displayed by those utilities over the over his sample

1 period (2005-2014). In particular, the combined EBIT for the 11 Alberta utilities examined  
2 grew at a geometric average annual growth rate of 12.4% over that period, versus an  
3 average of 3.9% for the U.S utilities examined. These high growth rates in EBIT distort  
4 traditional measures of CV-EBIT. As noted by Dr. Cleary in his current evidence (page 22,  
5 lines 8-12):

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7 “This measure is preferable if there are significant differences in growth rates in  
8 EBIT across the different firms being compared. It is a valid measure of business  
9 risk, since it measures volatility in the operating profit margins for firms. It also has  
10 the advantage that, as a ratio, the expected value and past average values will often  
11 coincide since these *profitability margins often tend to gravitate to some long-term*  
12 *average.*

13 During the current proceedings, Dr. Cleary reports the CV(EBIT/Sales) but also examines  
14 the CV(EBIT) measure based on expected EBIT, since NP’s average annual growth rate in  
15 EBIT of 2.5% is comparable to that displayed by the proxy group utilities examined. So  
16 both measures are valid.

17  
18 Finally, the passage below from the AUC’s 2018 decision clearly indicates that it accepted Dr.  
19 Cleary’s similar analysis indicating “low earnings volatility” as “support for the conclusion that the  
20 affected utilities have generally low business risk.” In particular, page 111 of Decision 22570-D01-  
21 2018 (red and bold added for emphasis) states:

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23 **“9.3.1 Overall assessment of business risk**

24 534. Dr. Cleary agreed with the favourable assessment of business risk for the affected  
25 utilities included in credit rating reports issued by DBRS and S&P. Dr. Cleary stated that  
26 regulated Alberta operating utilities possess low business risk and enjoy solid regulatory  
27 support. Dr. Cleary undertook some empirical analysis that purported to support his  
28 conclusion that the affected utilities operate in a low-risk environment that enables them to  
29 earn above their approved ROEs with very little volatility in income.

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31 535. Part of Dr. Cleary’s empirical analysis examined the ability of the affected utilities to  
32 earn their approved ROE on a consistent basis from 2005 to 2016, which he described as a  
33 bottomline measure of the total risks faced by the utilities. The yearly figures illustrated  
34 that the affected utilities earned average and median ROEs above the approved ROE in all  
35 years except 2005, when the average ROE was 0.18 per cent below the approved ROE. Dr.  
36 Cleary submitted this can be considered the strongest indication that the affected utilities  
37 possess low overall risk.

38  
39 **Commission findings**

40 536. The Commission accepts that the favourable financial performance and **low volatility**  
41 **of earnings** illustrated by Dr. Cleary is **support for the conclusion that the affected**  
42 **utilities have generally low business risk.”**