

1 Q. Reference Evidence of Laurence Booth dated September 25, 2018

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3 **Pages 51-52 and pages 63-64: Explain in what manner Dr. Booth believes that the**
4 **DCF method and DCF estimates should be considered by the Board in establishing**
5 **the fair return for Newfoundland Power, for example should it be given equal weight**
6 **with an adjusted CAPM result or simply used as a factor or a check when considering**
7 **the fair ROE?**
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9 A. Most boards are reluctant to move away from the risk premium approach, which Dr. Booth
10 regards as justified given the fact it has by far the greatest academic support as well as
11 being the most highly ranked model by finance professionals. In contrast, the DCF model
12 is distinctly lower ranked by both groups. As a result, in neither theory nor practise do
13 finance academics or professionals accord equal weight to risk premium and DCF
14 estimates of the fair return. Consequently, Dr. Booth would not advise this Board to do so.
15 Moreover, *any* estimate can be cast in the risk premium framework, even if the data comes
16 from a DCF estimate. For example, in prior testimony before this Board Ms. McShane of
17 Foster Associates on behalf of NP would routinely produce DCF based risk premium
18 estimates. Dr. Booth regards using the insights gained from DCF estimates in a risk
19 premium framework as the best approach.
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21 Currently it is Dr. Booth's assessment that simply adding an historic utility risk premium
22 to a forecast LTC yield does not estimate a fair ROE. This is because real yields, the actual
23 yield minus the forecast inflation rate, are abnormally low. In this low real yield
24 environment, the DCF model provides support for the inputs into the risk premium model,
25 particularly in areas where the DCF model does have validity, which is in the overall
26 market return estimate. The DCF model relies heavily on forecast growth estimates: for the
27 overall market these are bounded by long run GDP growth rates, but for individual stocks
28 these growth estimates are often fanciful and fail simple diagnostics tests.
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30 For example, Mr. Coyne relies on a DCF estimate for the overall market based on
31 individual estimates for the companies in the index in Exhibits JMC 5 & 6. Overall, he
32 accepts a growth rate of 8.21% for Canada and 10.80% for the US both for use in the
33 *constant growth* DCF model. In neither case are these growth rates possible: it is simply
34 impossible for dividends to grow at 8.21% for Canada or 10.80% for the US *forever* when
35 US and Canadian GDP is forecast to grow at barely 5.0%. Applying these short-run
36 *earnings growth* rates to a constant *dividend growth rate forever* model is simply wrong.
37 Further looking at the actual estimates makes this conclusion obvious. Apart from the fact
38 that many of the firms in JMC-5 do not have any growth estimates, those that do have rates
39 inconsistent with the assumption of the constant growth DCF model: Kinder Morgan
40 Canada, for example, cannot possibly grow at 61.98% forever. This is almost certainly the
41 short-term earnings growth resulting from the Government of Canada buying the
42 TransMountain pipeline at a premium to book value.