

1 Q. Reference: *Probabilistic Based Transmission Reliability Summary Report*, Appendix
2 A, Page 2 of 56.

3 *“The purpose of this study is to assess the adequacy of Newfoundland and Labrador*
4 *Hydro’s Interconnected Island System (IIS) generation and transmission equipment*
5 *under critical N-1 and N-2 contingencies on a probabilistic basis.”*

6 Does Teshmont agree with Hydro’s assessment that the loss of the Labrador Island
7 Link bipole be treated as an N-2 contingency? In the response, please address if
8 Teshmont has assessed whether or not the failure of the Labrador Island Link bipole
9 is plausible, likely enough, and critical enough to be treated as a single N-1
10 contingency (ie. require power flow in all other elements of the power system to be
11 at or below normal rating).

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14 A. Based on NERC transmission System Planning Requirements TPL-002 (April 2005,
15 and adopted for this study), a HVdc bipole outage is classified as a Category C event,
16 which is a loss of two or more bulk system elements. The newly adopted TPL001-4
17 considers the loss of a HVdc bipole as Category P₆ - multiple contingency (two
18 overlapping singles) or Category P₇ - multiple contingency (common structure).
19 Regardless of the criticality or the frequency of such an outage, system
20 performance needs to be assessed based on the NERC TPL rules. From a NERC
21 perspective, interruption of firm transmission services and non-consequential load
22 loss are allowed post these types of events.